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Abstract— In this study, we attempt to add to the literature of 
Connected and Automated Vehicle (CAV) security by 
incorporating the security vulnerabilities and countermeasures of 
the Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) and their access 
technologies. Providing knowledge to the vehicles or other entities 
involved with modern transportation in such networks, is the key 
to proper traffic management, efficient use of resources, and to 
improve the transportation safety, which is referred to as 
Intelligent Transportation System (ITS). As a critical component 
of the ITS, soon to be deployed VANETs, are not immune to the 
cyber/physical adversarial risks. Compounding VANETs and 
modern vehicles will allow adversaries to gain access to the in-
vehicle networks and take control of vehicles remotely to use them 
as a target or a foothold. Extensive attention has been given to the 
security breaches in VANETs and in-vehicle networks in literature 
but there is a gap in literature to assess the security vulnerabilities 
associated with VANETs’ access technologies. That is, in this 
paper we contribute to the CAV security literature in threefold. 
First, we synthesize the current literature in order to investigate 
security attacks and countermeasures on VANETs as an ad hoc 
network. Second, we survey security challenges that emerge from 
application of different VANETs’ access technologies. To augment 
this discussion, we investigate security solutions to thwart 
adversaries to compromise the access technologies. Third, we 
provide a detailed comparison of different access technologies 
performance, security challenges and propound heterogeneous 
technologies to achieve the highest security and best performance 
in VANETs. These access technologies extend from DSRC, 
Satellite Radio, and Bluetooth to VLC and 5G. The outcome of this 
study is of critical importance, because of two main reasons: (1) 
independent studies on security of VANETs on different strata 
need to come together and to be covered from a whole end-to-end 
system perspective; (2) adversaries taking control of the VANETs’ 
entities will compromise the safety, privacy, and security of the 
road users and will be followed by legal exposures, as well as data, 
time and monetary losses. Outcome of this study communicates 
VANET and its access technologies security risks to the policy 
makers and manufacturers who are concerned with the potential 
vulnerabilities of the critical transportation infrastructures. 
Index Terms–VANETs, VLC, 5G, DSRC, WAVE. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
t was only two years after the first wired car hacking that 
Miller and Valasak demonstrated wireless hacking on a Jeep 
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Cherokee and decided to demonstrate part of their work to 
public in order to stimulate the automotive industry as well as 
the policy makers to take action [1]. To this point, 
researchers/hackers have successfully hacked a handful of 
vehicles and divulged some of the vehicular architecture 
security vulnerabilities. Elevated demand for cutting-edge 
technologies, fast implementation of connected/automated 
vehicles and affordability, are just a few reasons why rigorous 
security measures and policies have been overlooked. Today’s 
vehicles are computers on wheels equipped with Wi-Fi routers, 
Bluetooth modules and dozens of Electrical Control Units 
(ECU). Even further, some foresee cars as a platform to offer 
on-demand technologies and services to the customers. On-
demand applications could be accessible by third-party 
developers to the road users, in a similar fashion as the iPhone 
App store [2]. Such advancements could transform vehicles into 
personal computers but with multitudinous security 
vulnerabilities [3].   
Starting in the 1980s, researchers started to develop the 
concept of vehicular wireless communication [4]. Since then, to 
overcome issues with road safety, road users’ comfort, 
transportation efficiency and environmental impacts, inter-
vehicular communication (IVC) development significantly 
increased [5]. VANET is a subclass of Mobile Ad hoc Network 
(MANET) that employs Dedicated Short Range 
Communication (DSRC) technology tuned to the 5.9 GHz 
frequency. Visible Light Communication (VLC) is a common 
alternative technology proposed to be used in VANETs which 
brings in certain pros and cons once applied for vehicular 
communications [6]. VLC is a strong candidate for this 
application because the bandwidth associated with it expands 
from 400 THz up to 790 THz which lies far away from radio 
frequency (RF) and contributes to solving the RF congestion 
problem. Other than VLC and DSRC, the potential access 
technologies for VANETs include Bluetooth, 5G and Satellite 
Radio. VANET involves vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) –also 
known as inter vehicle communication (IVC)– and vehicle-to-
infrastructure (V2I) communication, relying on a wireless 
environment [5]. Vehicular communication deals with several 
security challenges that need to be resolved prior to any real-
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world implementation. These challenges are due to e.g. high 
node mobility, irregular connectivity, large-scale environment, 
availability and dilemma between privacy and authentication 
[5, 7]. 
For VANET to be successfully implemented, different 
players would need to trust the system. They will fail to trust 
VANET if security vulnerabilities exist. Although errors are 
inevitable, VANET environment has low tolerance for error. 
The success of the VANET depends on individuals to trust 
information that is broadcasted to them. It is critical that such 
information cannot be eavesdropped and /or tampered by an 
adversary. To stop adversaries from causing any harm to the 
ITS critical infrastructure, the system should provide 
prevention strategies in addition to detection and recovery 
strategies. Such prevention strategies need to be built into the 
design from inception. A handful of reasons to secure VANET 
prior to implementation are proposed in [8] as: (1) design phase 
is the most effective stage to prevent exposure, (2) initial 
security consideration will eliminate those unsecure proposals, 
(3) blind eye to attackers will endanger the system robustness. 
Additional to the aforementioned reasons, in context of 
VANETs, security issues are involved with passenger safety 
which indicates how critical VANET security issues are 
compared to any other ad hoc network.  
In real world implementations, the vulnerabilities are not 
limited to VANET security issues. In fact, smart vehicles which 
are considered as nodes in VANETSs, own internal 
vulnerabilities of themselves which are referred to as in-vehicle 
network security issues. A malicious user can always take 
advantage of the VANET security breaches and find a way to 
access the internal bus of a vehicle, usually CAN bus and as a 
result take control of the vehicle braking system, engine, air 
conditioning system and steering wheel which in fact is 
remotely driving the vehicle  [9]. This study attempts to survey 
the impacts of security vulnerabilities of ITS, by exploring 
possible consequences of an adversary hacking the VANET 
system. To this aim, we draw a bridge between VANET and on-
the-market vehicle security vulnerabilities, to elucidate that it is 
exceedingly plausible for an adversary to breach into any of 
them and impose dire consequences. Cyber/physical attacks 
will compromise safety, privacy and security of the 
transportation network, followed by consequences such as data, 
time and monetary loss [10]–[14].   
This study, first, surveys the security vulnerabilities and the 
proposed countermeasures for VANETs as a general ad hoc 
network, and next investigates the security issues and 
challenges that vary based upon the access technology being 
used by VANETs. This is the first attempt to tie these two 
concepts together and assess the security breaches and 
countermeasures in VANETs as a whole end-to-end system. 
More importantly, this is study is the first attempt to scrutinize 
the pros and cons of using each technology and compare them 
in terms of performance and security. As an example of access 
technologies, the literature on 5G are massive, however most of 
the contributions consider performance as the main metric and 
overlook the critical issues of security. We are attempting to 
bridge the gap between security and performance as two critical 
evaluation metrics for deployment of VANETs. This will be 
followed by a brief discussion on the ramifications of a 
malicious behavior on road users and operators and to suggest 
countermeasures to mitigate such a risk. Our key contributions 
are summarized as: 
• Surveying VANET attacks and countermeasures. 
• Surveying the attacks and countermeasures that come 
with application of VANETs’ access technologies. 
• Comparing the VANETs’ access technologies from the 
security point of view. 
• Comparing the VANETs’ access technologies from the 
performance and feasibility point of view  
• Discussing the possible impacts of an adversarial activity 
on road users and operators. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 
2 presents basics of the VANET, Section 3 discusses VANET 
vulnerabilities and defense mechanisms that have been 
suggested to secure VANET from a general ad-hoc network 
perspective summarizing the interrelation between VANET 
vulnerabilities and current cyber/physical attacks in the vehicle 
arena. In addition, in Section 4 we investigate the access 
technologies and the pros and cons that come along each of 
them as well as the specific security issues and vulnerabilities 
that they bring along. Finally, we conclude the paper with 
Sections 6. 
II. VANET BASICS 
A. Communication  
In 1999, United State Federal Communication Commission 
(US-FCC) assigned 5.850-5.925 GHz band for vehicular 
communication [15]. This 75 MHz of spectrum is referred to 
as DSRC. DSRC is IEEE 802.11-2012 standard, proposed to 
amend IEEE 802.11p-2011 overhead operation [16]. Later in 
2006, IEEE 1690 specified standards for Wireless Access in 
Vehicular Environment (WAVE) application layer and 
message formats [16, 17] for operation in DSRC 
communication. DSRC has a large bandwidth and is able to 
use up to seven channels [17]. The platform supports 
communication ranges up to 1000 meters, with 100 and 300 
meters for highway and urban applications, respectively [18]. 
Other than DSRC communication which is the most common 
type of access technology being discussed today, there are 
several strong candidates for VANETs which outperform 
DSRC in terms of data rate, cost, bandwidth, or coverage 
depending on the situation. This includes: VLC which relies 
on transmitting information via visible light which is 
ubiquitous in the ambient; Satellite Radio which is primarily 
intended for occupants of motor vehicles and is already 
implemented and brings in global coverage; Bluetooth that is 
all available in the modern vehicles and already used for 
communicating with the users or in the infotainment systems; 
and last, 5G which is a promising generation of wireless 
communication in which different technologies get to coexist 
Kelarestaghi et al. 
                                                                                 Virginia Tech University 
 
3 
in a hybrid communication network and create a highly 
efficient and fast system.  
B. Characteristics vs Drawbacks 
VANET is a wireless network where fixed and mobile nodes 
communicate with each other. Such system has characteristics 
such as frequent disconnections, dynamic topology and high 
node mobility. Each of these characteristics may result in a 
security vulnerability that threatens the system. Compared to 
the MANET, VANET has relatively higher mobility. In 
VANET, vehicles move randomly within the network and their 
movement is constrained to the network topology. Due to the 
high node mobility, VANET topology is dynamic and 
unpredictable; due to this and other factors such as adverse 
weather condition, VANET may suffer from various 
disconnections throughout the system. Other characteristics of 
the VANET are indicated in Table 1.  
Table 1 VANET’s characteristics [19]. 
Characteristic Description 
High node mobility VANET has higher mobility compare to MANET, 
which reduces the mesh in the network (possible 
routes for communication) [20], [21].  
Dynamic topology Topology of the network alter fast, the durations of 
the communications are short and density of 
nodes vary extensively based on the location and 
time of the day which can facilitate cyberattacks 
[22]. 
Frequent disconnections Adverse weather conditions in addition to the 
network mobility, high speed of  nodes, and 
topology may cause frequent disconnection 
[22]. 
Transmission medium Air is a transmission medium which is accessible to 
adversaries [22]. 
Anonymity of the support The anonymity structure might allow adversaries to 
act maliciously within similar frequency band 
[8]. 
Energy storage and 
computing 
No energy constraints. However, the real time 
environment is a challenge [22]. 
Predictability The dissemination of nodes is limited by the city 
roadmaps which makes the routing of nodes 
more predictable [19] 
C. Model 
VANET model is structured into infrastructure and Ad-hoc 
environment [23]. In the infrastructure environment, different 
entities can be interconnected. These entities include the 
following:  manufacturer, Trusted Third Parties (TTPs), legal 
authority and service provider. Manufacturer may be 
responsible for vehicles’ unique identification, while legal 
authorities are responsible for vehicle registration and offence 
reporting. TTPs and service providers both are offering 
different services in VANET environment such as credential 
management and location-based services (LBS). On the other 
hand, the ad-hoc environment is where V2I and V2V 
communications are taking place. This communication occurs 
through OBU, sensors and Trusted Platform Module (TPM)–
TPMs are installed for security purposes [23]. Depending on the 
access technology being used, the connection between the 
infrastructure and the ad-hoc environment varies. For example, 
this connection happens via RSU if the access technology is 
DSRC, or via the 5G BTS of the access technology is 5G. 
Section 4 includes multiple figures that illustrate the VANET 
model and how it changes based on the access technology. 
Figure 1 illustrates a simple structure for the VANET model. 
 
Figure 1 Architecture of VANETs. 
 
D.  Application 
VANET’s application setting can be classified into four main 
sections [23]; V2V warning propagation, V2V group 
communication, V2V beaconing, and infrastructure-to-
vehicle/vehicle-to-infrastructure (I2V/V2I) warning. 
Applications that gain the most attention can fit into safety-
related and comfort-related applications [24]–[27]. On the latest 
fact sheet provided by US Department of Transportation [28], 
twenty eight safety applications on V2I and V2V environment 
have been introduced; pedestrian in signalized crosswalk 
warning and pre-crash actions are among those applications. 
On the other hand, non-safety applications aim to provide 
comfort for road users in addition to improve traffic efficiency 
(e.g. eco-traveler information, eco-lanes management). The 
complete list of applications can be found in [29]. 
III. VANET SECURITY 
A. Adversarial categories  
Acquiring a solid understanding of the nature of a potential 
adversary and its capabilities is essential in order to provide a 
secure communication network of any type. Based on 
membership, motivation, method and scope, an attacker can lie 
into four categories [24, 25] in the context of VANETs: (1) 
Insider (legitimate member of a system) and outsider (intruder 
with more limitation than insider). (2) Malicious attacker with 
no personal profit (e.g. pranksters) and rational attacker who 
pursues reward but, may be more predictable than malicious 
attacker (e.g. greedy driver). (3) Active attacker to generate 
packets and passive attacker with aim of eavesdropping (e.g. 
snoops). Depending on how sophisticated an adversary is, 
his/her attack may result in dire consequences. In spite of other 
type of attackers, insiders (or industrial insider) may impose 
highest risk to the VANET, yet the likelihood is very low and 
can be prevented. (4) Local attacker has limited control over 
entities, while an extended attacker is able to control various 
entities throughout the VANET in a larger extent.  Depending 
on how sophisticated an adversary is, their attack may result in 
dire consequences. Unlike other type of attackers, insiders (or 
industrial insider) may impose highest risk to the VANET, yet 
the likelihood is very low and can be prevented. 
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Figure 2 Adversarial categories for VANETs. 
B. Challenges 
Technical and socio-economic challenges are the key 
challenges of VANETs; the first one deals with system 
functionality as well as challenges to balance security and 
privacy needs, while the later deals with market introduction 
and penetration [5]. Although socio-economic challenges may 
impact different parties (e.g. road operators), technical issues 
are considered a fundamental constraint to a successful 
deployment [26, 27]. This means that even at the presence of 
socio-economic assurance, solutions for technical challenges 
should be available [31]. To maintain networks of different 
types in general, a protocol should address the following 
technical requirements: (1) authentication, (2) confidentiality, 
(3) availability, (4) integrity, (5) non-repudiation, and (6) 
privacy. Deployment of VANETs however, not only mandates 
the aforementioned requirements on security perspective to be 
satisfied, it imposes strict throughput requirements as a highly 
dynamic real-time system, and faces VANET specific 
challenges like key distributions at a short period of interaction 
between the vehicles due to mobility of system. Last not least, 
bringing in a new technology is a smooth transition, proving the 
benefits of VANETs in a smaller scale is a non-trivial task for 
the manufacturers due to limited number of users. Negligible as 
it might seem, the latter highly effects the legislators on one 
hand and decision makers at technical level on the other hand. 
The following explains how the general network security 
requirements match to VANETs. 
 
§ Authentication: all nodes within the VANET have to be 
authenticated to be secure from an attacker that is trying to 
compromise the system using a falsified identity. Failure to 
maintain a proper authentication system can result in 
drastic degradation in a communication network [34, 35].  
§ Confidentiality: which is another requirement that assures 
only a legitimate user can access the data [21]. Failing to 
address confidentiality puts the security of the exchanged 
data at stake and affects privacy of the users [23].  
§ Integrity: the guarantee that the message content remains 
secure. Attacks on integrity and authentication will enable 
adversaries to inject false messages [36] . Preserving data 
integrity is one of the most important VANET security 
goals. The message content should be secure while 
communicating V2V and V2I [37], and adversaries should 
not be able to alter or fabricate the messages.  
§ Availability: it is an important requirement of the VANET 
that guarantees system functionality at all time. Although 
attacks on availability have been selected as the most 
critical attacks [37], in [38] authors believe that data 
integrity and confidentiality have higher priority than 
availability. This is due to the risks that are associated with 
sensitive information being disclosed by adversaries. Since 
safety messages will not include any sensitive information, 
authentication will be sufficient to provide security for 
safety messages (no need for encryption) [31].  
§  Non-repudiation security goal should be addressed [17, 
31]. Satisfaction of the non-repudiation requirements 
assures that an entity cannot deny having sent or received 
a message [40].  
§ Privacy: another challenge of VANET is that the privacy 
of users should be maintained. A successful protocol 
should be able to preserve drivers’ privacy by preventing 
adversaries to track their vehicles and to link vehicle 
identity with the driver’s identity [23]. However, this 
security goal should not prevent trusted authorities to 
identify drivers or track vehicles. To solve this issue, Lin 
et al. [41] introduced secure and conditional privacy 
preservation protocol (GSIS). This protocol found to 
preserve the privacy of the entity while providing trusted 
authorities’ ability to trace a vehicle in any traffic event 
dispute.    
C. Attacks & Countermeasures 
Reliance of ITS on IVC with ordinary nodes for a 
decentralized operation (unlike the conventional counterparts 
which is controlled by a central location such as the railroad 
dispatch system) makes it more vulnerable to cyberattacks and 
may result in an intelligent collision [8]. To thwart attacks such 
as Denial of Service (DoS), Blum and Eskandarian proposed 
secure communication architecture called SecCar [8]. This 
virtual infrastructure will assure IVC availability and 
confidentiality, and will identify the malicious users’ identities. 
Also, with the non-repudiation feature, entities cannot deny 
participating in an attack. Parno and Perrig [30] proposed 
authenticated localization of message origin to address secure 
relative localization in VANET which prevents attacks such as 
wormhole attacks which is a challenging attack to defend 
against because in this type of attack all of the nodes in the 
network can provide authenticity and confidentiality. In brief, 
the attacker records packets in one location of the network and 
tunnels them to another location in the network [42]. In their 
proposed scheme, anonymization service, provides a solution 
for conflict between authentication and privacy. Drivers’ short-
term identity simultaneously, creates secure authentication and 
prevents adversaries from spoofing identities. In addition, use 
of secure aggregation techniques for applications and primitives 
for message authentication and key establishment are 
suggested.   
Raya et al. [7] proposed security architecture that comprises 
of different components: (1) Event Data Recorder (EDR), (2) 
Tamper-Proof Device (TPD), (3) Vehicular Public Key 
Infrastructure (VPKI) based on (4) Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
(ECC). EDR acts like an airplane black box. EDR records 
vehicle’s critical information such as location and speed, while 
TPD is responsible for cryptographic operation and storing 
cryptographic information, particularly signing and validating 
safety communications. Certificate Authorities (CAs) will issue 
VPKI for vehicles. CAs shall be cross-certificate so vehicles of 
different regions can authenticate each other. To secure 
authenticity, vehicles need to sign messages with their keys and 
attach the corresponding certificate.  The security architecture 
proposed the use of ECC to manage security overhead. To 
address privacy issues, anonymous keys that changes 
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frequently by speed may be used (every couple of minutes); the 
keys will be preloaded in TPD for a certain period of time (1 
year). In spite of addressing basic requirements of a secure 
VANET, there are certain shortcomings in [7] against jamming 
GPS signals for instance that leads to DoS and severe 
consequences. The signals are weak and vulnerable to jamming, 
can be spoofed easy and simple approach of frequency hopping 
is no more able to solve this problem.  
The following section provides, survey of threats to 
VANET’s availability, authentication, identification, 
confidentiality, integrity, data trust, privacy and non-
repudiation, along with defense mechanisms to prevent them. 
D. Availability 
Availability assures that VANET is functional. Threats to 
availability can be directed towards both communication 
network and participating nodes [23]. There are different types 
of attacks that can be launched to bring down the availability of 
VANETs. Previous studies have proposed various security 
mechanisms to thwart threats on the availability.  
Among attacks that threaten the availability of the VANET, 
DoS is the most famous one that can affect both RSU and OBU 
to jam and compromise the network. In DoS attack, adversaries 
aim to either overload the communication channel or to create 
interferences to hinder the use of the communication channel. 
Signature based authentication scheme, proposed by He and 
Zhu [43], based on the pre-authentication process, reduces the 
impact of DoS attacks. This scheme prevents attackers from 
forcing the receiving entities to perform redundant signature 
verifications.  
Distributed DoS (DDOS) also can threaten VANET 
availability by sending frequent transmissions where more than 
one entity is sending out malicious messages [44]. Biswas et al. 
[44] illustrated that VANET with IEEE 802.11p mechanism is 
vulnerable to the synchronization-based DDoS attack mainly 
caused by small contention window sizes and periodicity of 
service beacons, and it is possible that neither sender or receiver 
notice the attack, due to lack of acknowledgement mechanism. 
Authors put forth a solution to address this problem which 
require modifications to MAC layer mechanisms. Increasing 
the contention window size, and randomization of inter arrival 
time of service beacons are the basis of their solution to prevent 
DDoS attacks. In the case of timing attack, adversary is trying 
to delay the messages that need to be broadcasted to an adjacent 
vehicle. To mitigate this attack, Mejri et al. [22] proposed a 
cryptographic solution by providing the timestamping 
mechanism to certify the time of an event.  
Group-signature based schemes are also beneficial in the case 
of message tampering or alteration. In this scheme, 1) each 
member of a group can anonymously sign messages, and 2) a 
group manager can trace a signer [45]. To preserve the privacy 
of the group members, unlinkable schemes were proposed (e.g. 
[46]), in which a user’s various interactions in the VANET 
cannot be linked [47]; a verifier cannot determine whether the 
messages are being transmitted from the same vehicle or 
different vehicles. This makes unlinkable group signature based 
schemes vulnerable to the Sybil attack [45]. To solve this issue, 
Domingo-Ferrer and Wu [45] proposed message-linkable group 
signatures (MLGS) scheme. With MLGS it is easy to identify 
whether two signatures on one message are generated by one 
entity or two entities. In general, Sybil attacks are on top of the 
security threats to VANETs. 
 Wormhole is another DoS attack that can compromise the 
VANET routing protocol. This attack is executed by creating a 
tunnel between two or more malicious entities to transmit data 
packets [31]. This type of attack can be launched without prior 
knowledge of the network. Those malicious entities can execute 
DoS attack if gaining unauthorized access [48]. Hu et al. [49] 
proposed Packet Leashes mechanism to limit the maximum 
distance that a packet can be transmitted, hence prevent the 
tunneling operation. 
Another attack that can threaten the availability of VANET is 
the black hole attack. In this attack, a node either declines 
participation in a routing operation or drops out data packets. 
Dropping out can cause a message propagation failure [21]. 
Cherkaoui et al. [50] proposed a cluster-based algorithm that 
provides security scheme to thwart the black hole attack. The 
algorithm identifies the attack and isolates the malicious entity. 
They used the Simulation of Urban Mobility (SUMO) traffic 
simulation to simulate a real-world mobility model and to 
execute the black hole attack. In this study Cluster-Head 
oversees V2V communications within the cluster and is 
responsible for detecting black hole attacks and to broadcast 
warning messages to other members of the cluster. Gray hole 
attack also is similar to the black hole, where an adversary 
focuses on applications that are sensitive to the packets’ loss 
[22]; In black hole attack a malicious node drops all data 
packets while in the gray hole attack the node always forwards 
its own packets [51]. In this attack, the behavior of the attacker 
is random, since the node can act maliciously for specific 
periods of time while other times it can be as normal as other 
nodes [52]. Survivable Ad hoc and Mesh Network Architecture 
(SAMNAR), proposed by Nogueira et al. [51], provides 
reactive and tolerant security mechanism to thwart DoS attacks 
such as gray hole attacks. The result of simulation indicates that 
SAMNAR can significantly improve the security to minimize 
the performance loss.  
Greedy behavior is another type of attack where a greedy node 
does not follow the waiting time regulation for accessing the 
channel based on CSMA/CA protocol. Upper bound 
enforcement on the access time of nodes after a training process 
is the solution proposed at [53].  
Several other attacks that threaten VANET availability are 
Malware (i.e. viruses and spam) [48, 54], spamming [21, 54], 
and jamming [55]. Table 2 indicates a list of attacks and security 
mechanisms to prevent those attacks.  
E. Authentication, Identification and Privacy 
In VANET each entity should have its own identity that is 
called entity identification [23]. The requirement to verify the 
rightfulness of this identification is entity authentication [23]. 
For VANET, authentication includes user authentication and 
message integrity [39]; entities should only reply to messages 
that are coming from an authorized source [48]. Adversaries 
can threaten the authenticity of the system by impersonating 
vehicles or RSUs. A malicious entity can transmit false 
messages to make-believe that a certain road is congested, to 
dissuade others from using that road [21].   
To preserve authentication, a unique identifier should be 
assigned to each entity. This identification does not need to be 
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the actual identity for each of the participating entities [23]. 
Similar to the concept of license plate, Hubaux et al. [56] 
proposed Electronic License Plate (ELP) that allows a vehicle 
to be both identified and authenticated. ELP certifies vehicle 
identity and can be used for dynamic pricing and to identify 
vehicles that escape a scene of a crash [56]. However, since 
ELP is linked with entity real identity, public key certificates 
are proposed as a substitute [23]. VPKI is designed to assure 
that public key belongs to an authenticated node. In this 
scheme, ELP is linked with a pseudonym that is being managed 
by the VPKI, and a legal authority can link the pseudonym with 
the owner’s real identity [23].  
To secure authentication and identification, Gollan and 
Meinel [57] proposed a combination of digital signature and 
Global Positioning System (GPS) to substitute traditional 
solutions (e.g. license plate) that are easily forgeable. GPS 
signals however are weak and vulnerable to spoofing. There are 
different countermeasures for encountering GPS spoofing at 
[58]. Zeadally et al. [21] identified digital signatures as a 
suitable mechanism to thwart attacks on authentication. Raya 
and Hubaux [31] used digital signature as the most efficient 
approach. With this method, a sender digitally signs the 
message to address the authentication requirement.   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Availability - Attacks and Security Mechanisms.  
Security Goal Cyber Attack Security Mechanism 
Availability [31], 
[59], [23], [21], [60] 
DOS [20], [21], [61]  
DDOS [44] 
Jamming [62] 
Greedy behavior [63] 
Broadcast tampering [21] 
Malware [20], [48] Spamming [20], [21] 
Message 
Fabrication/alteration/tampering/suppressi
on [22] 
Black hole [20], [21], [48] 
Gray hole [22], [51], [52]  
Sinkhole [22] 
Wormhole [64], [65] 
Tunneling [66] 
Timing attack [48], [67] 
Sybil attack [66] 
Signature based authentication mechanisms [43], [31], [45] 
Secure Communication Architecture (SecCar) [68] 
MAC layer modifications on contention window size, and randomization of inter 
arrival time of service beacons [44] 
Switch between channels or even communication technologies. In worst case 
scenario VANET should turned off [31]. Frequency hopping technique FHSS consist 
of cryptographic algorithm [22] 
CSMA/CA modifications [63] 
Timestamping mechanism [21] 
Message-linkable group signatures (MLGS) scheme [45] 
Cluster-based algorithms[51] 
SAMNAR [51] 
SAMNAR [51] 
Packet Leashes mechanism  [49] 
Packet Leashes mechanism  [49] 
Cryptographic solution using timestamps [21] 
Message-linkable group signatures (MLGS) scheme  [45] 
 
A well-known threat to authentication is Man-in-The-Middle 
(MITM) attack, wherein malicious node eavesdrop the 
communications and inject false data [48]. To secure the system 
from MITM attacks, authentication can be provided with VPKI 
[8]. Hesham et al. proposed using both ELP and Chassis 
number to create Vehicle Authentication Code (VAC) to 
support PKI-based VANET [69]. Distance bounding protocols 
are also proposed to secure the authentication especially against 
MITM and wormhole attacks [70].  
Hubaux et al. [56] proposed distance-bounding protocol as a 
solution for authenticating vehicle location; their protocol can 
also detect jamming attacks. Distance-bounding protocol aims 
to provide upper bound for a distance between authorized 
nodes, by timing the delay between transmission and response 
[71]. Illusion attack is another attack that threatens the 
authentication of the system. In the case of an Illusion attack, 
an adversary transmits fake traffic warning messages to an 
adjacent vehicles and can cause illusion situation (e.g. traffic 
congestion) [40]. While traditional message authentication and 
integrity check are abortive to thwart the illusion attack [40], 
Plausibility Validation Network (PVN) stated to be a successful 
approach [72]. PVN conducts plausibility check on the 
collected data received by the vehicle, and examines the 
validation of the messages [72]. 
Securing authenticity and privacy of the system concurrently, 
causes conflict [5]. For instance, the conflict can transpire when 
an unauthorized user takes advantage of VANET protocol and 
gains access to the location of a vehicle [73]. While it is critical 
to secure the system, privacy of the users have to be maintained 
[31]. Several methods have been proposed to overcome this 
problem. Application of a random/temporary identifier is 
proposed as one of the main strategies to overcome this issue 
[74]. Sampigethaya et al. [73] investigated an anonymity-based 
mechanism (AMOEBA scheme) to protect the system against 
location tracking. AMOEBA applies the concept of group 
navigation of vehicles (cluster neighboring vehicles in groups) 
to attain location privacy.  
In tracking attack, the location of a vehicle in a certain time 
can be captured by an adversary [75]. In [7] and [31] anonymity 
techniques are proposed to secure the privacy of the vehicle. 
Both studies use anonymous key pairs (public/private key pair) 
to protect privacy. This key is authenticated by the certification 
authorities (CA) and thwarts tracking attack. To protect driver’s 
identity and to minimize the storage cost, the key changes 
according to the vehicle speed to ban observer from tracking the 
key owner. 
 Group Signature and Identity based Signature (GSIS) is a 
cryptographic approach presented by Lin et al. [41], aimed to 
tackle the tradeoff between security and  privacy preservation. 
GSIS benefits from both group signature and identity-based 
signature, to provide security and privacy for V2V and V2I 
communications. In this scheme group signature assures the 
anonymity of the sender, and the identity-based signature 
assures the authenticity of a message. This method is however 
time consuming and might not be the best choice for VANETs 
[76]. Freudiger et al. [77], proposed a creation of mix-zones 
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(anonymizing regions), by use of cryptography, to address 
drivers’ location privacy. This technique provides security by 
preventing adversaries from gaining access to the messages and 
preserving the privacy of drivers by changing pseudonyms (to 
ensure unlinkability). 
In addition to the listed attacks that threaten the authentication 
and identification of a system, there are several other 
approaches such as a naive Brute force attack. This type of 
attack can be easily avoided by using large enough keys and 
identification numbers that require huge amount of time to 
break [78]. Table 3 provides a survey of cyber threats and 
several defense mechanisms to secure VANET authentication, 
Identification and privacy. 
F.  Confidentiality, Integrity and Data Trust 
Confidentiality in the VANET environments assures that 
messages are only being read by legitimate node, while 
Integrity and data trust aims to protect messages from 
manipulation and alteration [23]. Insider and/or outsider 
adversaries can threaten the confidentiality of the exchanged 
messages by eavesdropping and information gathering attacks 
(passive attack) [21]. Data trust can be compromised in a case 
when an adversary manipulates a message to for instance sends 
a false warning or inaccurate information to affect VANET 
reliability. To safeguard communications confidentiality, and 
integrity and data trust, security mechanisms should be built-in-
design. 
 
Table 3 Authentication, Identification and Privacy - Attacks and Security Mechanisms. 
Security Goals Cyber Attack Security Mechanism 
Authenticity and 
Identification [15, 25], 
[39] 
Eavesdropping [66] 
MITM [48], [79] 
Brute force [22] 
Illusion attack  [40] 
DOS [80] 
Sybil attack [80] 
Replay [30] 
GPS spoofing/position faking [14, 35] 
Message 
Fabrication/alteration/tampering/suppression/deleti
ng [48] 
Masquerading [48] 
Tunneling [15, 66] 
Key and/or certificate replication [66] 
Node impersonation  [48] 
Black hole [66] 
Grey hole [66] 
Wormhole [48] 
Message saturation  [66] 
 
Vehicle Authentication Codes (VAC) [64]  
Augmented digital signatures and GPS data [53] 
Authorized access on hardware and software [22] 
Access to sensors should be authenticated and verified [22] 
Deployment of trusted hardware [82] 
Plausibility Validation Network [72] 
   Secure Location verification [6, 68] 
Timestamping mechanism [21]  
Digital Signatures [43], [56], [84], [85], [86], [87], [88], [8], [31], [45], 
[89], [7], [23] 
Secure Communication Architecture (SecCar) [8] 
Validation check with CRL (Certificate Revocation List) [31] 
Variables MAC and IP addresses [31], [7] 
Distance Bounding protocols [56], [71], [82]  
Electronic License Plate (ELP) [56] 
Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) [90] 
 
Privacy [31] 
Eavesdropping[66] 
Tracking [66] 
Social engineering [79] 
Tampering hardware [66] 
GPS spoofing/position faking [66], [91] 
 
 
    Digital Signatures [21], [31], [40], [92] 
Augmented digital signatures and GPS data [69] 
Variables MAC and IP addresses [31] 
Anonymity techniques [38], such as key changing algorithm [31] 
Use of anonymous, and preloaded keys that change according to the 
vehicle speed [7] 
Use of random identifiers that change over time [74] 
Location Cloaking techniques [93] 
Data Aggregation Mechanism  [94] 
    AMOEBA [73] 
Group signature based scheme: GSIS [41] 
Silent Period [95] 
Mix-zones [77] 
Controlling manufacturer employees [66] 
Timing based sanity checks for GPS protocol [58]  
 
 
Besides authentication and identification, the Brute force 
attack is also against the confidentiality of the VANET. In this 
attack an adversary aims to find the cryptographic key or the 
vehicle network ID [22, 96]; since the duration of 
communications are typically short, executing such attack can 
be challenging. Langley et al. [97] proposed large random value 
as a vehicle’s VIN to thwart Brute force attack. For an attacker 
to assure guessing a correct VIN combination he needs to 
determine this random value as well. This security posture 
includes additional security measure, to decreases the 
likelihood that an attacker can compromise the vehicle identity.  
Other mechanisms to secure VANET confidentiality are 
Secure Group Communication (SeGCom) [98] and Situation-
Aware Trust (SAT) [99]. In SeGCom scheme, proposed by 
Verma and Huang [98], RSUs are responsible to establish a 
symmetric key (for a period of time) with vehicles that are 
entering the region. To increase the accuracy of group 
formation, the region separated into splits with split key, to be 
used for group communication. Hong et al. [99] proposed a 
descriptive attribute-based encryption to improve entity trust 
among vehicles. Attributes can be used to identify the common 
properties for a group of vehicles and enforce data access 
policies accordingly. In this approach, only group members are 
able to decrypt the transmitted messages. SAT model is capable 
of thwarting attacks such as eavesdropping, tracking, forging 
and jamming [100].  
MITM and Illusion attacks are among the attacks that are 
threatening the integrity and data trust of the VANET [40, 48, 
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79]. In the MITM attack an attacker actively eavesdrop the 
communication between vehicles and eventually attempts to 
inject fabricated messages between those vehicles [48, 79]. 
Attacker intention is to control the communication while the 
vehicles presume otherwise. In the illusion attack adversaries 
use sensors to inject false data, such tampering would have an 
impact on drivers’ behavior [40]. An adversary can sway the 
traffic to avoid a certain road by falsifying that there is a heavy 
congestion along that road. Authentication protocols may have 
minimal capability to thwart illusion attacks since an adversary 
connection is genuine [22]. In contrary, the replay attack can 
formed by an unauthorized node [22] and it can be prevented 
by applying timestamp mechanism [21]. In the replay attack an 
adversary can repeat or delay the transmission of messages in 
order to manipulate the data, hence, violate the integrity of the 
data.  
Masquerading attack is another threat against VANET 
integrity. In this attack, an attacker appeared as an authenticated 
node and is able to inject false messages. Raya and Hubaux [31] 
stated that digital certificates are effective to overcome this 
attack. In this approach, all nodes need to sign their messages 
with their public keys, and such key is unique and verifiable. 
To thwart the message fabrication attack, VPKI and zero-
knowledge –an entity proves its authenticity without revealing 
its identity– techniques can assure the authenticity of a node and 
validity of the message [22, 74]. Similar approach can also 
prevent MITM attacks, by providing robust authentication [22]. 
Park and Zou [101] proposed two-directional verification 
technique to secure data integrity in VANET. With this 
approach recipient entity receives a message twice and if one of 
them is false the entity would not assent either of them. And if 
only one message being received by the entity, the message can 
be approved with low confidence.  
Brute force attacks, cryptographic information replications and 
tampering with hardware are other possible attacks to be named 
here, threatening the confidentiality and integrity in VANETs. 
Table 4 indicates a list of threats and security mechanism in 
terms of confidentiality and data integrity of the VANET.   
 
 
Table 4 Confidentiality, Integrity and Data Trust - Attacks and Security Mechanisms. 
Security Goals Cyber Attack Security Mechanism 
Confidentiality [59], 
[20], [21] 
MITM  [48], [79] 
Brute force [22][96][78] 
Eavesdropping [20][22] 
Traffic analysis [78] 
Tampering hardware [66] 
Key and/or certificate replication [66] 
Encrypt data with great importance, Application of VIPER (Vehicle-to-Infrastructure 
communication Privacy Enforcement Protocol) algorithm [102] 
SAT (Situation-Aware Trust) [99] 
Group key management protocol (GKMP) involve with geographically defined group 
[103], [104] 
SeGCom (Secure Group Communication) [98] 
Controlling manufacturer employees to prevent tampering with hardware [66] 
Integrity and Data 
Trust [59], [105], 
[106], [23] 
MITM  [48], [79] 
Illusion attack [40] 
Message suppression/fabrication/ 
alteration/tampering [81], [30] 
Masquerading [22] 
Replay [30] 
Black hole [21], [48], [54] 
 
Gray hole [51], [52], [107] 
 
Worm hole [51], [48], [64], [65] 
Message saturation [66] 
Broadcast tampering [66] 
Node impersonation [66] 
Digital certificates [7], [23] 
Authorized access on hardware and software [22] 
Access to sensors should be authorized and verified [22] 
Deployment of trusted hardware [82] 
VPKI  [8], [31], [45] 
Group communication in which group key management system (GKM) is responsible 
for keys [45], [75] 
Secure Communication Architecture (SecCar) [8] 
Timestamping mechanism [21]  
Plausibility Check [72] 
Two directions Reporting [101] 
Threshold-based trust [47] 
MLGS (Message Linkable Group Signature) [45] 
G. Non-repudiation 
VANET Non-repudiation goal is to assure that different 
entities are not able to deny their actions. In repudiation-type 
attacks several entities use similar identifications to repudiate 
their actions [23]. For instance, a vehicle in the VANET can 
deny sending a message (repudiation of origin) or either 
receiving one (repudiation of receipt). Non-repudiation of 
origin (NRO) and receipts (NRR) assure that an entity is 
accountable for the messages that it transmitted and received. 
  Elliptic Curves Cryptography (ECC) proposed among the 
best mechanisms to ensure NRO [23]. Basically, IEEE 1609.2 
standard [108] supports Elliptic Curve Digital Signature 
Algorithm (ECDSA) because, compared to other algorithms 
ECDSA provides smallest keys and signatures. As a subtype of 
digital signature application of the group signature mechanisms 
ensures the NRO [109, 110]. Although group signature based 
mechanisms are apt to ensure NRO, there are some glitches 
when it comes to ensuring the NRR [23]; for instance, having a 
group leader in between of the RSU and the group members can 
threaten the availability of the group leader. 
Table 5 Non-Repudiation – Attack and Security Mechanisms. 
Security 
Goals Cyber attack Security Mechanism  
Non-
Repudiat
ion 
/Account
ability 
[31][39] 
Masquerading [31] 
Loss of event 
traceability [22] 
MITM [66] 
Message 
suppression/fabric
ation/ 
alteration/tamperin
g [66] 
Node 
impersonation [66] 
Replay [66] 
Electronic License Plate (ELP) [56]  
Secure Communication Architecture 
(SecCar)  [8] 
Authorized access on hardware and 
software [22] 
Access to sensors should be authorized 
and verified [22] 
Deployment of trusted hardware [82] 
Elliptic Curves Cryptography (ECC) 
[23]  
Signature based schemes [109], [110], 
[8], [31], [45]   
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SecCar scheme, proposed by Blum and Eskandarian [8], also 
ensures the non-repudiation of the VANET. With distributed 
intrusion detection system, entities can reject forged messages 
and enforce non-repudiation. To thwart loss of traceability 
(repudiation), Mejri et al. [22] suggested only an authorized 
access to the hardware and software in the VANET. Singelee 
and Preneel [82] suggested the deployment of a trusted 
hardware in which an adversary cannot alter the existing 
protocols and values. Summary of threats and security 
mechanisms in terms of non-repudiation are listed in Table 5.  
Figure 3 summarizes the threats and security measures in 
terms of VANET six different types of general security goals. 
The connector links are color coded according to each of the 
security goals. For instance, the availability goal is color coded 
as red. In addition, the links are placed in order, initiated from 
the availability goal (color coded in red) and ended with privacy 
goal (color coded in black). 
 
 
Figure 3 Schematic view of VANET cyberattacks and security mechanisms. 
 
IV. SECURITY ISSUES BASED ON ACCESS 
TECHNOLOGY  
Several access technologies have been proposed for VANETs 
in the state of the art. Security vulnerabilities vary based on the 
technology being used, hence, we overview the potential 
technologies for implementing VANETs as well as the security 
issues that come along with them.  
A. WAVE (802.11 p):  
The standard is the improved version of IEEE 802.11a with 
improvements in MAC layer and physical layer in order to 
enhance the robustness in highly mobile vehicular 
environments.  On the physical layer, OFDM modulation is 
applied on 7 channels of 10 MHz which are further divided into 
52 subchannels. The messages are categorized into four groups 
based on their priority and CSMA/CA is used as the collision 
avoidance mechanism in a half-duplex communication which 
can provide up to 27 Mb/s with a coverage of up to 1000 meters. 
However, the NLOS communication path leads to high delays 
and packet collisions which reduces the reliability [6]. 
WAVE has three main components: Application Unit (AU), 
Onboard Unit (OBU) and Roadside Unit (RSU). AU can 
communicate with OBU through wire or wireless and can be 
located in the same physical unit of the OBU [12, 13]. OBU, 
other than providing AU a communication access, exchanges 
data with RSUs and other OBUs. Some of OBU’s major 
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functions are wireless radio access, network congestion control, 
data security and IP mobility [112]. On the other hand, RSU can 
extend the range of ad hoc network communication, run safety 
applications and also providing internet connectivity to OBUs 
[111]. Just like any other technology, DSRC faces certain 
limitations which mostly stem from the highly dynamic, fast 
moving, and non-predictable networks some of which are given 
at Table 6.  
 
 
Figure 4 DSRC as the access technology for VANETs. 
 
Table 6 DSRC’s limitations. 
Characteristic Description 
Limited bandwidth 75 MHz of DSRC band barricade its application 
in some countries [22] 
Attenuations Shortcomings of DSRC’s transmission cause 
issues due to frequencies, fading, Doppler effect 
and delays [22].  
Limited transmission 
power 
Maximum transmission distance in most cases is 
1000 meters where repeaters as an intermediate 
device can be implemented [22]. 
Nonreliable in highly 
dynamic environment 
Vehicles move randomly within the network and 
their movement is constrained to the network 
topology.  
Latency  Due to the high node mobility, VANET topology 
is dynamic and unpredictable; due to this and 
other factors such as adverse weather condition, 
VANET may suffer from various disconnections 
throughout the system. 
 
B.  Bluetooth IEEE 802.15.1: 
Bluetooth is a widely used standard for shortrange 
communications. It was first invented by Ericsson to replace 
RS-232 cable connections [113, p. 15]. Developed by Jim 
Kardach, Bluetooth works conventionally between 2402 MHz 
and 2480 MHz which contains 79 channels of 1 MHz 
bandwidth each [114]. Since 2.4 GHz ISM is already a 
congested band, Bluetooth uses a frequency hopping (FH) 
technique with rate of 1600 hops/sec in order to avoid 
congestion with WiFi for instance. A lower power protocol 
named Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) however, uses only 40 
channels of 2 MHz, among which three channels are used for 
broadcasting purposes and the rest are used for data 
transmission. This technology supports connection speed of up 
to 24 Mbps (Bluetooth 3) and is commonly used in intra-vehicle 
applications in the infotainment system, navigating via GPS and 
allowing phone calls via in-car interface. Easy deployment and 
the fact that the technology is already recognized, make 
Bluetooth a good candidate for VANETs. On the other hand, 
the proper operating range for Bluetooth is 10 meters while it 
extends up to 100 meters at the price of higher complexity or 
lower quality of service. Whether or not this operating range is 
suitable targeting applications in VANETs is discussed in a 
framework [115], where authors justify the applicability of BLE 
for VANETs by exploring the range, signal quality and latency 
of BLE signals in vehicular environment. They conduct 
experiments using smartphones equipped with BLE attached to 
cars and read the quality of channel in different environments. 
They compare BLE with WiFi and DSRC and conclude that 
BLE is a strong candidate for VANETs in dense areas. To be 
more specific, BLE has already been implemented (unlike 
DSRC) and has high power efficiency (unlike WiFi) and its 
limitation is mainly the range which is investigated in detail in 
their work. The performance of the system such as latency and 
throughput are important metrics however are beyond the scope 
of this work. We cover the security aspect of using Bluetooth 
for VANET communications.   
 
Figure 5 Bluetooth as the access technology for VANETs. 
 
New security challenges come along however if Bluetooth is 
used as the main access technology in VANETs. An open 
source Bluetooth packet sniffing hardware and software named, 
Ubertooth was designed by Michael Ossmann, which is the 
most affordable (130$) Bluetooth testing and monitoring 
platform [110, p. 7]. Considering that the technology is already 
on the market, this can be an indication of a well-recognized 
security vulnerability in Bluetooth transmission. D. Spill et al 
for instance demonstrate a packet sniffing by reverse 
engineering the hopping pattern of the FH system at a Bluetooth 
transceiver by extracting the MAC address (MAC address is 
used for generating the pseudo random hopping pattern in 
Bluetooth protocol) of the device in a framework that they call 
Bluesniff [117]. Bluesniff uses Ubertooth as the main hardware 
and software platform. There are several demonstrations of 
attacks on Bluetooth to be named here such as eavesdropping 
the pairing pin [118], or performing a known plaintext attack on 
the Bluetooth keystream generator demonstrated at [119] and 
extended at [120].  
The current Bluetooth standard targets limited security 
services such as authentication (a challenge-response scheme 
[121]), confidentiality, authorization, integrity, pairing or 
bounding in a far from perfect way. Other services such as non-
repudiation are missing parts of this patch that need to be 
implemented.  
There are 4 modes in the standard that define when the 
security mechanism needs to be initiated, named mode 1-4 (the 
Bluetooth 2.0 supports only modes 1-3) summarized in Table 
7. The security procedures that are initiated at service level, are 
basically enforced after link establishment but before logical 
channel establishment. In fact, the authentication and 
encryption mechanisms are implemented in the controller (there 
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is a centralized security manager that maintains policies in the 
Bluetooth architecture). Security Mode 3 mandates 
authentication and encryption for all connections to and from 
the device before the physical link is fully established. This 
mode lacks authorization and can lead to security vulnerability 
named “authentication abuse.” Authorization is basically 
allowing the control of resources by making sure the device is 
authorized to do so. In this mode, since authorization check is 
not performed, an authenticated remote device can access a 
Bluetooth service without the device owner’s knowledge which 
is called “authentication abuse”. Last, not least, mode 4 
enforces service level security mechanisms. This mode has 5 
levels of security which are shown in Table 8. It uses secure 
simple pairing (SSP) and provides authenticated link keys as 
well as secure connections if implemented on level 4 which is 
the strongest one in terms of security. Looking into Table 7 the 
question is “why mode 1 still exists?” Due to backward 
compatibility! (should be eliminated from VANETs because 
the risk impact is really high if devices are tricked to switch to 
this mode) [122].  
 
Table 7 Security modes in Bluetooth. 
Security Mode When the device initiates security 
4 Service 
3 Link 
2 Service (2.0 and earlier**) 
1 Never (2.0 and earlier**) 
 
According to NIST guide to Bluetooth security [122], the 
number of vulnerabilities in Bluetooth implementations and 
specifications which provide the platform for attacks on 
Bluetooth can be summarized as per below. We limit the 
discussions to Bluetooth 4.0 and above due to lack of space as 
well as to maintain focus on more recent technology.  
Table 8 Mode 4 security levels, protections and specifications.  
Mode 4 
levels 
Security 
Requirements 
Provides MITM 
protection 
Encryption 
Required 
Level 4 Authenticated link key 
using Secure 
Connections required 
Y Y 
Level 3 Authenticated link key 
required 
Y Y 
Level 2 Un-Authenticated link 
key required 
N Y 
Level 1 No security required N Y 
Level 0 No security N N 
1. Just works association model (in this mode at least one of 
the devices do not have the required hardware for 
performing the authentication, hence there will be no 
authentication) opens the chances for unauthenticated link 
keys and is vulnerable to MITM attack.  
2. SSP Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) [123] keys are 
weakly generated, non-unique or static.   
3. Security mode 4 devices or units are allowed to fall back to 
all previous modes including mode 1 which facilitates even 
simple attacks.  
4. Unlimited authentication requests can be made. Even 
though there is an exponential waiting time between 
authentication requests so as to prevent brute force attacks 
on the keys; such waiting times do not exist for the 
challenge-response requests. Hence, an attacker can brute 
force the challenge responses and consequently figure out 
information about the key.  
5. The master key used for broadcast encryption [124] are the 
same which can lead to impersonation attacks.  
6. The E0 stream cipher algorithm used for conventional 
Bluetooth are weak  
7. Once the address is captured and associated with a 
particular user, it can be means of undermining that user’s 
privacy.  
8. Legacy pairings provide no passive eavesdropping 
protection  
9. Keys need to be stored securely 
10. There is a high degree of freedom for generating the 
pseudo random numbers which could be weak and follow 
decipherable patterns  
11. Only device authentication is provided and there is no 
user authentication  
12. Secure Bluetooth links are not sufficient, end-to-end 
security mechanism is needed 
13. There is always more to add to Bluetooth security stack 
such as non-repudiation 
14. Application to VANETs requires the nodes to be 
discoverable all the time which can open the gate for 
multiple attacks! Usually in conventional application of 
Bluetooth devices are in the discoverable mode for a short 
period of time.  
15. Overhead is always the big drawback of complicated 
security mechanism, specifically in VANETs that are more 
sensitive to overheads and the delays imposed by them. To 
compromise on overhead as well as the resources, the 
devices that are already paired do not go through the 
authentication process. This authenticated device can be 
used for malicious purposes later on.  
The vulnerabilities mentioned above open the way to 
multifarious attacks such as:  
 
Bluesnarfing [125]: In this attack, the adversary uses the 
device’s international mobile equipment identity (IMEI) 
number to route all the calls from the user’s device to the 
attacker’s device. Having access to the storage is very important 
for running this attack and secure storage techniques could be a 
proper countermeasure.  
Bluejacking [126, 127]: Bluejacking is less of a harmful attack 
resembling fishing in software security. This type of attack is 
not harmful unless the content sent by the attacker conducts a 
more complex attack.  
Bluebugging [128]: This is type of attack is a rather strong 
attack developed based on a bug on older versions of Bluetooth 
where the attacker finds access to the commands of the 
Bluetooth device and can run them independent from the user’s 
input.  
Car Whisperer [129]: White-hackers used a non-random key 
in car kits to break into Bluetooth and send audio to or receive 
it from microphones in the car. 
DoS [128]: DoS attacks are general less complicated types of 
attacks that focus on occupying and draining the resources until 
the device stops functioning properly.  
Fuzzing Attacks [130]: This is a simpler type of attack that can 
be performed with less expertise or access to the resources. The 
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attacker simply crafts mal-formed messages and sends it to the 
device to keep the device busy decoding these non-proper 
messages. 
SSP [131]: This type of attack forces the device to switch to 
Just Works mode. As stated earlier this mode is prone to MITM 
attacks, hence, impersonation attacks can be performed by the 
attacker.  
Bluesniff [117]: a packet sniffing by reverse engineering the 
hopping pattern of the FH system at a Bluetooth transceiver by 
extracting the MAC address (MAC address is used for 
generating the pseudo random hopping pattern in Bluetooth 
protocol) implemented on Ubertooth.  
Authentication abuse [122]: In Bluetooth mode 3, since 
authorization check is not performed, an authenticated remote 
device can access a Bluetooth service without the device 
owner’s knowledge which is called “authentication abuse”.  
Table 9 associates each of these attacks to the vulnerabilities of 
Bluetooth mentioned by NIST. 
 
Table 9 Cyberattacks/Root cause of cyberattacks on Bluetooth.  
Cyber attack Vulnerability # Ref. 
Bluesnarfing  5,9,10,11 [125] 
Bluejacking  11,13,14 [126], [127] 
Bluebugging  8,11,13,14 [128] 
Car Whisperer  5,7,9,11,15 [129] 
DoS  4,11,13,14,15 [128] 
Fuzzing Attacks  2,6,11,14,15 [130] 
SSP Attacks  1,2,3,6,8,11 [131] 
Bluesniff  9,10,12,14,15 [117] 
Authentication abuse 11,14 [122] 
 
Even though Bluetooth wireless technology has a high 
potential for building a platform for VANETs, there exist 
numerous security vulnerabilities in the implemented versions 
of it outside of VANETs. These vulnerabilities and the attacks 
on a Bluetooth device associated with these vulnerabilities are 
detailed in this section. Not only the general wireless 
networking vulnerabilities such as DoS attacks, eavesdropping, 
MITM attacks, and message modifications, need to be 
concerned, but also more specific attacks exist that pertain to 
Bluetooth only which are listed in table 9. Last, even if strong 
security patches are defined for the wireless connection, the 
wired connections in the end-to-end system are not protected 
and a higher layer security solution is required next to a secure 
Bluetooth and IEEE 802.11 [132, p. 802].  
C. Satellite Radio (2.345-2.60 GHz): 
Satellite radio is originally defined for broadcasting satellite 
services intended for occupants of vehicles. This, as well as 
wide coverage on geographical regions that normally fall out of 
coverage regions of cellular networks makes satellite radio a 
strong potential for vehicular communications where the 
vehicles as the main nodes are highly dynamic and cannot be 
restricted to a specific region. It is not sufficient to use only 
satellite radio to provide coverage for VANETs however; this 
technology needs to be augmented with the existing terrestrial 
access technologies to fill the coverage gap that they bring 
along. Satellite augmentation is used for enhancement of 
performance of a standalone GPS system [133] or messages in 
vehicular networks such as SafeTRIP [134] in S-band, UMTS 
or directly between vehicles. Here are the applications that 
satellite augmentation can bring into vehicular communications 
reported in [134]: (1) communications with the control center, 
sensor data transmission (temperature/humidity),  (2) automatic 
emergency calls (with video) in case of accident, (3) stolen 
vehicle tracking, (4) road safety alerts, (5) collaborative road 
alerts, (6) real-time tracking of vehicles: vehicle tracking, fleet 
management, (7) live TV/audio, (8) multimedia datacast, (9) 
driver alertness service (10) information about nearby points of 
interest. 
Satellite radio channels can provide as high bandwidth as 90 
MHz however high latency, hundreds of milliseconds, is one of 
its main drawbacks [135]. This technology avoids the CAPEX 
concerning the low populated areas, it is ecologic oriented and 
provides global coverage (high scalability). Large antenna 
dimension is another potential obstacle standing on the way of 
using satellite radios for V2I communications. Authors at [136] 
propose Ku-band geostationary earth orbit (GEO) satellite to 
encounter the size problem by shifting to slightly high 
frequencies. The conventional satellite radio uses the 2.3 GHz 
S-band, while Ku-bands lie between 12 GHz and 18 GHz which 
helps to solve the interference problem with satellite broadcast 
which is the main use for satellite radio. Phased array antennas 
which are strong enough to provide high throughput 
communication can be designed in Ku-bands and implemented 
on top of the moving vehicles without drastically changing the 
aesthetics of the current vehicles [137]. 
 
 
Figure 6 Satellite augmentation architecture. DVB-SH (Digital Video 
Broadcasting - Satellite services to Handhelds) is a physical layer 
standard for delivering IP based media content, based on a hybrid 
satellite/terrestrial communication [134]. 
Such hybrid networks with satellite radio as a component 
have major security issues due to the following [138]. First, the 
broadcast nature of satellite communication is a security threat. 
Second, not all security mechanisms are applicable to satellite 
communications. High latency of these systems requires the 
security mechanism to impose as low additional latency as 
possible to the system. Third, satellite messages are prone to 
burst errors, so the security patch needs to be robust enough to 
handle burst errors.  More details are given on the 
attacks/vulnerabilities that come along with satellite 
communications.  
Confidentiality of information: the broadcast nature of satellite 
communications [138] provides the opportunity for an 
eavesdropper to establish a channel and listen to the 
information. A performance evaluation of satellite 
communications in presence of an eavesdropper is given at 
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[139] where sensitivity to ionospheric conditions (common 
phenomenon at high frequencies) are also taken into account. 
The latter is a physical layer perspective framework.  Physical 
layer solutions as well as network/transport layer solutions are 
used to maintain confidentiality of data. 
Spoofing: Integrity of satellite data can be undertaken by an 
adversarial party who is able to generate spoofing data. Physical 
layer/network layer methods are used to combat this type of 
attack which are explained in detail after covering the attacks in 
the sequel.    
Session hijacking: A type of man in the middle attack where 
an attacker steals a valid user’s session token which identifies 
the user to the server and gives them access to their account. 
Using malwares is a common tool for a hijacker. Network layer 
security solutions are given in the sequel to target this type of 
security breach [140].    
Authentication: TCP PEP, and SSL implemented together.    
Denial-of-service: a sufficiently well-equipped adversary can 
send commands to the satellite and jam or disrupt the 
communication   
To thwart such attacks network layer-transport layer and 
physical layer solutions have been investigated. 
Network layer-Transport layer solutions: Internet Security 
Protocol (IPSec) or Secure Socket Layer (SSL), which are 
originally designed to provide end-to-end unicast security at 
transport layer for terrestrial communications, face issues like 
high delays or malfunctioning of the entire protocol, when 
applied to the aforementioned hybrid networks.  
Performance Enhancing Proxy (PEP) is widely deployed in 
satellite networks today. It compensates for the large delay 
caused by slow TCP when operating with satellites with high 
delay, simply by sending early acknowledgements. IPSec 
however is not able to coexist with PEP. IPsec has been 
originally defined for point to point communications. It does 
not allow for authentication in an intermediate node. Hence 
TCP PEP which is an intermediate node cannot read or decrypt 
the TCP header. If used alone, however, IPSec adds 34 bytes of 
overhead when providing both security and authentication. The 
same happens to HTTP proxy, and it cannot operate in presence 
of IPSec. As for the SSL, its conventional use in terrestrial 
communications is to secure the HTTP connection when 
needed with encryption, which is called HTTPS. In satellite 
communications though, SSL encryption does not allow the 
HTTP proxy to function correctly. TCP PEP can function 
correctly if only SSL is used.  
In order to use the existing network layer security protocols 
in Satellite communications, modifications need to be made due 
to the shortcomings mentioned above. A hierarchical approach 
to key management in hybrid networks is introduced in [138] 
which extends the state of the art solutions contributing to this 
problem. 
Physical layer solutions: The physical layer security 
measures are usually evaluated using a metric named “secrecy 
rate” which is an information theoretic measure of the amount 
of resources that are being used for the legit communication 
compared to the eavesdropping channel. Deviation from a 
predefined secrecy rate can be used as an indicator of malicious 
activities on a channel. On the other hand there are many 
physical layer solutions that target spoofing attacks on satellite 
radio [141]. For instance angle of arrival (output of an array of 
antennas element) is used as a metric for detecting anomalies in 
the communication [142].  Another example of designing 
intrusion detection systems for satellite radio signals is given at 
[143] where fingerprinting based on the variations in the signal 
levels is used for detection of malicious activities. 
D. Visible Light Communication (VLC) IEEE 802.15.7: 
VLC uses the visible light frequencies 430-790 THz as a 
communication variant. LEDs are mainly used as the intensity 
modulation sources due to their fast switching time and support 
up to 500 Mbps for short distances. Recently it has been 
demonstrated that using similar techniques to MIMO-OFDM of 
radio frequency the data rate of a VLC link in an indoor scenario 
can raise up to 1Gb/s [144]. IEEE 802.15.7 provides 
specifications for achieving a high data rate and flicker free 
communication [145, p. 7]. Even though the idea of using VLC 
as the access technology for VANETs is still under 
consideration and has not been implemented yet, using LEDs in 
transportation systems dates back to 1998 [146, 147]. Internet 
connectivity has always been considered as the strongest 
application for VLC. 
In comparison with other access technologies, much higher 
data rate, low power consumption, low cost, no interference 
with already crowded radio frequency are the advantages that 
come with deploying VLC into VANETs. It is originally a 
NON-LoS communication technology which makes it less 
prone to multipath distortion [130]. On the other hand, highly 
contaminated environment with noise and annoyance caused by 
flickering light, degradations in performance in non LOS 
communications, are the drawback associated with VLC [148]. 
As reported by Căilean et al. in [149] the solar noise in the 
background is 1000 times stronger than the VLC link 
containing data. In VLC it is not easy to establish bidirectional 
links between more than two transceivers. Hence, if VLC is to 
be used for communicating vehicles, each vehicle should be 
assumed to be a relay node and pass the information to the other 
vehicles. This is how information is propagated by VLC in 
VANETs. The latter makes VLC more applicable for 
broadcasting safety critical messages which are usually in 
broadcast format and do not require acknowledgement. Specific 
coding schemes, like Manchester coding which balance the 
number of 0s and 1s can be used for mitigating the flickering 
problem which ends up with high bandwidth consumption [149, 
150].  
 
 
Figure 7 VLC as a communication medium for VANETs. 
VLC shows a huge potential for I2V communications relying 
on the experiments conducted in [151], [152] where the authors 
study the channel quality between the street/traffic light and 
vehicle, and see a stable communication for range of up to 50 
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meters. For V2I communications [153] reports a link of 90 m 
with 4.8 Kbps. For V2V communications though, the range of 
a strong link is demonstrated to be multiple tens of meters based 
on [133]. Other than having a high potential for vehicular 
communications, VLC is feasible for platooning [154] and can 
be a strong candidate to replace GPS [156]. Other researchers 
have proposed integration of VLC into DSRC so as to take 
advantage of the benefits that come by each technology [157, 
158]. Căilean et al. [149] summarizes the challenges for VLC 
usage in vehicular applications as: (1) increasing the robustness 
to noise; (2) increasing the communication range; (3) enhancing 
mobility; (4) performing distance measurements and visible 
light positioning; (5) increasing data rate; (6) developing 
parallel VLC; and (7) developing heterogeneous dedicated 
short range communications and VLC networks. 
Unlike radio frequency based technologies, visible lights 
cannot penetrate through objects, hence, it can facilitate secure 
communication in indoor environments [159]. However, just 
like other access technologies, there exist certain security issues 
specific to VLC that can affect VANETs. 
Jamming: The physics of VLC channels are based upon 
transmission of information via photons, hence, these channels 
are modeled by Poisson process and their overall throughput 
does not increase monotonically by the number of users; it has 
an apex and saturates afterwards. This feature enables the 
jammers to saturate the channel by adding different sources of 
light. Other than that, a jamming attack can be simply launched 
by an adversary capable of achieving a higher illumination at 
the receiver than the legitimate communication link. Due to 
high directionality of visible light channels, it is not easy for the 
neighboring nodes to detect the presence of a jammer, hence, in 
large scale deployments, it is not possible to detect a jamming 
point in the network and propagate its location so as to avoid it 
by simply rerouting the traffic [160].  
Snooping and data modification: The naive assumption that 
due to directionality and visibility, snooping and data 
modification are difficult to do, does not mean they are 
impossible. Most of the MAC layer protection is assumed to be 
provided via cryptography which is prone to a wide range of 
attacks, not to mention the fact that in most cases manufacturers 
skip the cryptography at implementation or leave it to an 
optional mode based on user preference. The latter mostly 
stems from the lack of computational power. The security 
mechanisms suggested at IEEE 802.15.7 provide authenticity 
and confidentiality, but do not provide protection mechanisms 
for non-repudiation and integrity. Authors at [161] perform 
simulations as well as experiments in order to prove that data 
sniffing is feasible over an open VLC channel.  
Masquerade attacks: The current version of standard provides 
protection against the outsider adversaries and there is no 
security check for a malicious user within the group that share 
the peer-to-peer communication key. This opens up 
opportunities for an internal source to be compromised and 
further used for malicious purposes via what is so called 
masquerade attacks.  
Side-channel attacks: Since the data is modulated into the 
intensity level of the emitted light, the power consumption of 
the electric device changes to high and low accordingly. This 
power consumption pattern can be a means of intrusion for an 
adversary with proper hardware to track and decipher the bits 
[162].  
Eavesdropping: Experiments are performed in [163] to 
demonstrate the ease of eavesdropping without advanced 
hardware requirement in different scenarios of indoor/outdoor. 
There exist three well-known security mechanisms that can be 
used to protect VLC: proximity-based protection, 
steganographic protection, and cryptographic protection [164]. 
To prevent such attacks proximity based, Steganographic 
protection, chaffing and winnowing, and cryptographic 
solutions have been investigated. 
Proximity based solutions: Such a solution is limited to 
protected environments that offer snoop-free line-of-sight 
communication which is a challenging requirement in practical 
implementations.  
Steganographic Protection, chaffing and winnowing: In this 
type of protection information is secretly hidden inside the 
existing illumination. Unlike cryptographic solutions, 
steganography is more about confidentiality than integrity or 
authentication and it is less expensive to implement. Worth 
noting that violation of confidentiality directly relates to 
violation of integrity as well. Chaffing and winnowing is 
another method that can be used to provide authentication and 
confidentiality without using cryptography [165]. These 
methods are strong candidates to provide security when the 
resources to implement strong cryptos are not available.  
Cryptographic solutions: IEEE 802.15.7 proposes to place 
the cryptographic solutions on MAC layer to provide integrity 
and authentication. The research in the field of cryptography is 
usually narrowed down to secret key generation schemes which 
happen to be difficult to generate and vulnerable to vast variety 
of attacks. In ultrawideband channels however, researchers 
have proposed to exploit the channel characteristics to generate 
this key in a secure manner at [166]. To be more specific, due 
to channel reciprocity both the transmitter and the receiver 
experience the same channel propagation effects such as 
shadowing, fading or path loss, and this can be transformed into 
a metric and used for key generation in a non-mimicable way. 
VLC however, is less prone to multipath effect compared to 
radio frequency, hence, the dominant propagation effect in 
VLC is pathloss, which might be easier for an adversarial party 
to replicate one they know the characteristics of the 
environment.  
E. LTE/5G: 
Currently researchers have attended to investigate the 
challenges in regard to the 5G networks (e.g., [167]). However, 
the focus of the survey is only limited to the 5G performance 
challenges rather the security aspects of it. The future of 
communication systems is entangled with 5G. As 5G promises 
ultralow latency, ultrahigh capacity, infinite bandwidth, etc., 
the security challenges will be dramatic [168]. Heterogeneity of 
the technologies as well as the devices involved in 5G is the 
main reason for this, which might lead to security issues that are 
not recognized yet. It is of utmost importance to shed light on 
the security vulnerabilities of this technology and take them into 
account by design from inception, because 5G will have to 
tackle with much stronger threats. Mantas  et al. [169] 
categorizes the main targets of attackers as: users or nodes, 
access networks, core networks and external IP networks.  
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Figure 8 DSRC vs. LTE/5G for VANETs. 
 
Open operating systems in 5G will allow nodes to install 
applications from all adversarial/benign parties without having 
a well-defined infrastructure for authentication, in addition to 
the denial of service attacks which are very common on end 
users. Vehicles as the main nodes in vehicular communications, 
are vulnerable to numerous attacks via infotainment 
system/Bluetooth which target their internal network (such as 
CAN, FlexRay, etx.) which are elaborated in our previous work 
[9]. Malwares can undertake privacy of the user by accessing 
information such as location of the vehicle. Botnets on the other 
hand will be extensively used by attackers to take control of the 
vehicles due to openness of 5G to different connectivity options 
in uplink [170]. The compromised vehicles can be used later by 
the attackers as a new foothold to launch DoS attacks or 
congestion attacks on the other vehicles in the network [171].  
The focus of this work however is on how the access 
technologies that come with 5G will bring in new security 
challenges. Heterogeneity of access technologies, creates 
possibility for interoperability of devices equipped with 4G, 3G 
and 2G, this can open the way for an attacker to switch to 2G or 
3G by announcing unavailability of 4G and shifting the 
communication to 2G or 3G, hence taking advantage of the 
security vulnerabilities that come along the older access 
technologies. 4G as well, brings lots of security issues which 
are summarized in the table below. 
The radio resource control (RRC) and the handover confirm 
messages in 4G are not encrypted. This can help an attacker to 
access Cell Radio Network Temporary Identifier (C-RNTI) for 
each user and do location tracking [172]. Location tracking can 
also be done via following the packet sequence numbers and 
tracking them since they are continuous numbers [173].  
False buffer status report attacks are a subset of denial of 
service attacks which targets the load balancing, scheduling and 
admission control algorithms by sending false buffer 
scheduling messages and tricking the algorithm to allocate 
more resources to the attacker [172, 173]. The proposed 
solution for this problem is to use token based unique identifiers 
to provide authentication at MAC layer buffer status messages. 
Discontinuous Reception Period (DRX) is a period where a 
node can be in active mode however turn off the transceiver for 
reduced power consumption. This can be a foothold for a 
malicious node to insert messages. Table 10 provides a 
summary of these attacks and their corresponding footholds. 
Interested reader might see [172] for more information on MAC 
layer vulnerabilities of 4G standards (WiMAX and LTE).  
Table 10 Footholds of cyberattacks on LTE/5G. 
Attack Foothold Ref. 
Location tracking Cell Radio Network Temporary Identifier (C-RNTI); Packet Sequence Numbers  
[172] 
[173] 
False buffer status 
report attacks 
Lack of authentication in MAC layer 
false buffer messages  
[172] 
[173] 
Message insertion 
attacks Discontinuous Reception Period  
[172] 
[173] 
V. COMPARISON  
Making a solid decision on which access technology to 
choose is a non-trivial task. The tables below summarize the 
specifications of each technology and shed light on the security 
issues that come along with them. Table 12 more specifically 
gives a summary of the pros and cons of using each access 
technology for VANETs. Depending on the application, 
sometimes more than one technology should be used in an 
augmented solution, so as to benefit from the diverse 
advantages that they have. These are called hybrid solutions. 
The satellite radio for instance, is a strong candidate for being 
augmented with DSRC or 5G for a global coverage of 
communication links. VLC can provide high data rates with a 
low cost infrastructure for V2I communications in combination 
with any other technology to support V2V long range links.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
VANET is projected to augment safety, comfort, 
transportation efficiency, and to overcome the environmental 
impacts of transportation, but at the presence of security 
footholds all the advantages can dim. In the presence of any 
weaknesses, attackers can exploit VANETs’ availability, 
authentication, identification, confidentiality, integrity, data 
trust, privacy, and non-repudiation security goals. A successful 
security protocol shall be compliant with VANET security 
requirements with an all-inclusive approach. Moreover, there 
are many questions that need to be resolved prior to VANET’s 
large-scale implementation. For instance: (1) What would be 
the impact of known/unknown cyberattacks on transportation? 
(2) How a road user should react to the malfunctioned behavior 
of the car? (3) Do road users need to be trained for cyber 
intrusion events? and (4) Who should road users call for fixing 
their cars due to a cyberattack?  Security is a core technical 
challenge of the VANETs that if not appropriately executed, 
will drastically affect ITS network deployment. Prior to a real-
world deployment, security concerns should be raised and 
addressed throughout the ITS domain, or dire consequences 
will be inevitable [9, 10]. This should not only cover the 
security issues that exist in a general ad hoc network, but also 
cover the specific security issues that come along based on the 
access technology that is used in the VANET. Lessons learned 
from this study depict that road users’ safety, privacy and 
security can be compromised due to the VANET 
vulnerabilities. Adversaries not only can take control of 
vehicles but can compromise the traffic safety and leave a driver 
in a traumatic state. Eventually adversaries will supersede 
drivers to remotely-drive vehicles in the near future. We argue 
that due to the current gap in the literature with a focus on 
evaluating attacks’ consequences, security attack impacts on 
transportation network shall be explored via stated and revealed 
methods (e.g., [174]–[179]). 
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Table 11 Comparison of the available access technologies for VANETs. 
Access 
Technology Coverage Data Rate BW Status 
General Security  
Issues Specific Security Issues 
DSRC 1000 m 27 Mbps 75 MHz Incomplete 
Availability (Table 2) 
Authentication (Tables 3) 
Privacy (Table 3) See Table 6 
Confidentiality (Table 4) 
Non-repudiation (Table 5) 
Bluetooth 10-100 m 24 Mbps 78 MHz Implemented 
Eavesdropping 
MITM 
Impersonation  
Secure storage  See Table 9 Confidentiality (Table 4) 
Authentication (Table 3) 
Non-repudiation (Table 5) 
Integrity (Table 4) 
Satellite  35e6 m 
4 to 229 kilobits-per-
second; Changes with 
channel 
90 MHz Implemented 
Confidentiality (Table 4) 
Authentication (Table 3) 
Spoofing; Session 
Hijacking 
DoS 
MITM  
VLC  50 m (V2I); 20 m (V2V) 500-1000 Mbps  360 THz 
Not implemented, 
Available 
Eavesdropping 
Confidentiality (Table 4) 
Authentication (Table 3) 
Snooping 
Masquerade 
Non-repudiation (Table 5) 
Integrity (Table 4) 
Side channel attack 
Jamming 
LTE/5G 200-300 m  10 Gbps 270 GHz Not implemented, Available DoS; Congestion attacks See Table 10 
 
Table 12 Pros and Cons of the available access technologies  
Access 
Technology Pros Cons 
DSRC Wide Coverage  See Table 6 
Bluetooth Good for dense areas; High power efficiency Latency 
Satellite  Low cost; Extremely wide coverage (even the blind zones) 
Hundreds of milliseconds 
of delay; Burst errors 
VLC  
High data rate  
Low cost; No interference with 
radio frequency; Low power 
consumption 
High contaminated 
environment to noise 
Restricted field of view; 
Sensitive to flickering 
light; More suitable for 
broadcasting scenarios; 
Unable to provide 
bidirectional channels 
LTE/5G 
Low latency of 5 ms (V2I); Low 
latency of 100 ms (V2V); High 
Coverage 
 
The mmWave 
communication needs 
LOS 
 
This study sheds light on the new security issues that appear 
by application of different access technologies after fully 
covering the security challenges and their corresponding 
countermeasures from a general ad hoc network point of view. 
We contributed to the current literature of the CAV security by 
incorporating VANET and its access technology security 
challenges and comparing the different access technologies 
performance, security challenges and propound heterogeneous 
technologies. The access technologies that are covered here are 
DSRC, Bluetooth, Satellite radio, VLC, and 5G, however, new 
technologies can be proposed later since VANETs are at their 
infancy. There are multiple pros and cons pertaining to each 
technology and there is no solid formula for deciding on which 
technology is the best. The latter highly depends on application, 
demand, scale of the network and even geographical location, 
since VANETs are highly dynamic and diverse and cannot be 
limited to specific frame of a certain location or application.  
The types of security challenges in VANETs change 
extensively depending on the types of technologies being used. 
For instance, in a dense and low power scenario Bluetooth can 
be a good candidate for VANETs, however it is vulnerable to 
numerous attacks and its security issues need to be considered 
carefully. On the other hand, Bluetooth is already suffering 
from high latency and the security mechanisms associated with 
it need to be chosen carefully with a focus on minimizing the 
additional overhead. Another example is highways and roads 
that are located far away from cities and consequently 
inaccessible. Satellite radio is a strong candidate to provide 
coverage for such blind zones. However, it is not fully 
compatible with the security tools that have already been 
implemented and research needs to be done to fill in this 
security gap. One way to find a solution which meets the 
demands of VANETs is to augment technologies so as to take 
advantage of the different capabilities that they bring along. In 
this case, security mechanisms need to be combined together 
with ultimate elaboration and intricacy which requires 
significant effort.  
Not only the industrial parties and researchers, but also 
decision makers and policy makers need to be aware of the 
abundant security issues when VANETs are concerned. 
Unfortunately, the main focus so far has been on the 
performance and security has been overlooked. The security 
challenges that come with VANETs are either neglected or 
naively limited to general ad hoc network security issues that 
threaten VANETs. The main goal of this document is to provide 
a substantial framework which covers the security issues for all 
types of VANETs and provide the reader with necessary 
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technical details when the access technology changes in these 
networks.  
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